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Abstract
The goal of Byzantine Broadcast (BB) is to allow a set of fault-free nodes to agree on
information that a source node wants to broadcast to them, in the presence of Byzan-
tine faulty nodes. We consider design of efficient algorithms for BB in synchronous
point-to-point networks, where the rate of transmission over each communication link
is limited by its ”link capacity”. The throughput of a particular BB algorithm is defined
as the average number of bits that can be reliably broadcast to all fault-free nodes
per unit time using the algorithm without violating the link capacity constraints. The
capacity of BB in a given network is then defined as the supremum of all achievable BB
throughputs in the given network, over all possible BB algorithms.
We developNAB – a Network-Aware Byzantine broadcast algorithm – for arbitrary
point-to-point networks consisting of n nodes, wherein the number of faulty nodes is
at most f , f < n/3, and the network connectivity is at least 2 f + 1. We also prove
an upper bound on the capacity of Byzantine broadcast, and conclude that NAB can
achieve throughput at least 1/3 of the capacity. When the network satisfies an addi-
tional condition, NAB can achieve throughput at least 1/2 of the capacity.
To the best of our knowledge, NAB is the first algorithm that can achieve a constant
fraction of capacity of Byzantine Broadcast (BB) in arbitrary point-to-point networks.
∗This research is supported in part by Army Research Office grant W-911-NF-0710287 and
National Science Foundation award 1059540. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recom-
mendations expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
funding agencies or the U.S. government.
1 Introduction
The problem of Byzantine Broadcast (BB) – also known as the Byzantine Generals problem
[12] – was introduced by Pease, Shostak and Lamport in their 1980 paper [19]. Since the first
paper on this topic, Byzantine Broadcast has been the subject of intense research activity, due to its
many potential practical applications, including replicated fault-tolerant state machines [5], and
fault-tolerant distributed file storage [20]. Informally, Byzantine Broadcast (BB) can be described
as follows (we will define the problem more formally later). There is a source node that needs to
broadcast a message (also called its input) to all the other nodes such that even if some of the nodes
are Byzantine faulty, all the fault-free nodes will still be able to agree on an identical message; the
agreed message is identical to the source’s input if the source is fault-free.
We consider the problem of maximizing the throughput of Byzantine Broadcast (BB) in syn-
chronous networks of point-to-point links, wherein each directed communication link is subject to
a ”capacity” constraint. Informally speaking, throughput of BB is the number of bits of Byzantine
Broadcast that can be achieved per unit time (on average), under the worst-case behavior by the
faulty nodes. Despite the large body of work on BB [7, 6, 3, 11, 2, 18], performance of BB in arbitrary
point-to-point network has not been investigated previously. When capacities of the different
links are not identical, previously proposed algorithms can perform poorly. In fact, one can easily
construct example networks in which previously proposed algorithms achieve throughput that is
arbitrarily worse than the optimal throughput.
Our Prior Work: In our priorwork, we have considered the problem of optimizing throughput of
Byzantine Broadcast in 4-node networks [14]. By comparing with an upper bound on the capacity
of BB in 4-node networks, we showed that our 4-node algorithm is optimal. Unfortunately, the
4-node algorithm does not yield very useful insights on design of good algorithms for larger
networks. This paper presents an algorithm that uses a different approach than that in [14],
and also develops a different upper bound on capacity that is helpful in our analysis of the new
algorithm. In other related work, we explored design of efficient Byzantine consensus algorithms
when total communication cost is the metric (which is oblivious of link capacities) [15].
Main contributions: This paper studies throughput and capacity of Byzantine broadcast in arbi-
trary point-to-point networks.
1. We develop a Network-Aware Byzantine (NAB) broadcast algorithm for arbitrary point-to-
point networkswherein each directed communication link is subject to a capacity constraint.
The proposed NAB algorithm is “network-aware” in the sense that its design takes the link
capacities into account.
2. We derive an upper bound on the capacity of BB in arbitrary point-to-point networks.
3. We show that NAB can achieve throughput at least 1/3 of the capacity in arbitrary point-
to-point networks. When the network satisfies an additional condition, NAB can achieve
throughput at least 1/2 of the capacity.
We consider a synchronous system consisting of n nodes, named 1, 2, · · · , n, with one node desig-
nated as the sender or source node. In particular, we will assume that node 1 is the source node.
Source node 1 is given an input value x containing L bits, and the goal here is for the source to
broadcast its input to all the other nodes. The following conditions must be satisfied when the
input value at the source node is x:
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• Termination: Every fault-free node imust eventually decide on an output value of L bits; let
us denote the output value of fault-free node i as yi.
• Agreement: All fault-free nodes must agree on an identical output value, i.e., there exists y
such that yi = y for each fault-free node i.
• Validity: If the source node is fault-free, then the agreed value must be identical to the input
value of the source, i.e., y = x.
Failure Model: The faulty nodes are controlled by an adversary that has a complete knowledge
of the network topology, the algorithm, and the information the source is trying to send. No secret
is hidden from the adversary. The adversary can take over up to f nodes at any point during
execution of the algorithm, where f < n/3. These nodes are said to be faulty. The faulty nodes can
engage in any kind of deviations from the algorithm, including sending incorrect or inconsistent
messages to the neighbors.
We assume that the set of faulty nodes remains fixed across different instances of execution of
the BB algorithm. This assumption captures the conditions in practical replicated server systems.
In such a system, the replicas may use Byzantine Broadcast to agree on requests to be processed.
The set of faulty (or compromised) replicas thatmay adversely affect the agreement on each request
does not change arbitrarily. We model this by assuming that the set of faulty nodes remains fixed
over time.
When a faulty node fails to send a message to a neighbor as required by the algorithm, we
assume that the recipient node interprets the missing message as being some default value.
Network Model: Weassume a synchronouspoint-to-point networkmodeled as a directed simple
graphG(V,E), where the set of verticesV = {1, 2, · · · , n} represents the nodes in the point-to-point
network, and the set of edges E represents the links in the network. The capacity of an edge
e ∈ E is denoted as ze. With a slight abuse of terminology, we will use the terms edge and link
interchangeably, and use the terms vertex and node interchangeably. We assume that n ≥ 3 f +1 and
that the network connectivity is at least 2 f +1 (these two conditions are necessary for the existence
of a correct BB algorithm [7]).
In the given network, links may not exist between all node pairs. Each directed link is asso-
ciated with a fixed link capacity, which specifies the maximum amount of information that can be
transmitted on that link per unit time. Specifically, over a directed edge e = (i, j) with capacity
ze bits/unit time, we assume that up to zeτ bits can be reliably sent from node i to node j over
time duration τ (for any non-negative τ). This is a deterministic model of capacity that has been
commonly used in other work [13, 4, 9, 10]. All link capacities are assumed to be positive integers.
Rational link capacities can be turned into integers by choosing a suitable time unit. Irrational link
capacities can be approximated by integers with arbitrary accuracy by choosing a suitably long
time unit. Propagation delays on the links are assumed to be zero (relaxing this assumption does
not impact the correctness of results shown for large input sizes). We also assume that each node
correctly knows the identity of the nodes at the other end of its links.
Throughput and Capacity of Byzantine Broadcast
When defining the throughput of a given BB algorithm in a given network, we considerQ ≥ 1
independent instances of BB. The source node is given an L-bit input for each of theseQ instances,
and the validity and agreement properties need to be satisfied for each instance separately (i.e.,
independent of the outcome for the other instances).
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For any BB algorithmA, denote t(G, L,Q,A) as the duration of time required, in theworst case,
to completeQ instances of L-bit Byzantine Broadcast, without violating the capacity constraints of
the links in G. Throughput of algorithmA in network G for L-bit inputs is then defined as
T(G, L,A) = lim
Q→∞
LQ
t(G, L,Q,A)
We then define capacity CBB as follows.
CapacityCBB of Byzantine Broadcast in networkG is definedas the supremumover the through-
put of all algorithmsA that solve the BB problem and all values of L. That is,
CBB(G) = sup
A,L
T(G, L,A). (1)
2 Algorithm Overview
Each instance of our NAB algorithm performs Byzantine broadcast of an L-bit value. We
assume that the NAB algorithm is used repeatedly, and during all these repeated executions, the
cumulative number of faulty nodes is upper bounded by f . Due to this assumption, the algorithm
can perform well by amortizing the cost of fault tolerance over a large number of executions.
Larger values of L also result in better performance for the algorithm. The algorithm is intended
to be used for sufficiently large L, to be elaborated later.
The k-th instance of NAB executes on a network corresponding to graphGk(Vk,Ek), defined as
follows:
• For the first instance, k = 1, and G1 = G. Thus,V1 =V and E1 = E.
• The k-th instance ofNAB occurs on graphGk in the following sense: (i) all the fault-free nodes
know the node and edge sets Vk and Ek, (ii) only the nodes corresponding to the vertices
in Vk need to participate in the k-th instance of BB, and (iii) only the links corresponding
to the edges in Ek are used for communication in the k-th instance of NAB (communication
received on other links can be ignored).
During the k-th instance of NAB using graph Gk, if misbehavior by some faulty node(s)
is detected, then, as described later, additional information is gleaned about the potential
identity of the faulty node(s). In this case,Gk+1 is obtained by removing fromGk appropriately
chosen edges and possibly some vertices (as described later).
On the other hand, if during the k-th instance, no misbehavior is detected, then Gk+1 = Gk.
The k-th instance of NAB algorithm consists of three phases, as described next. The main contri-
butions of this paper are (i) the algorithm used in Phase 2 below, and (ii) a performance analysis
of NAB.
If graph Gk does not contain the source node 1, then (as will be clearer later) by the start of the
k-th instance of NAB, all the fault-free nodes already know that the source node is surely faulty;
in this case, the fault-free nodes can agree on a default value for the output, and terminate the
algorithm. Hereafter, we will assume that the source node 1 is in Gk.
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(a) (b)
Figure 1: Example graphs
(a) Directed graph G (b) Undirected graph G
(c) Two unit-capacity spanning trees
in thedirected graph. Everydirected
edge has capacity 1
(d) A spanning tree in the undi-
rected graph shown in dotted edges
Figure 2: Different graph representations of a network. Numbers next to the edges indicate link
capacities.
Phase 1: Unreliable Broadcast
In Phase 1, source node 1 broadcasts L bits to all the other nodes in Gk. This phase makes no
effort to detect or tolerate misbehavior by faulty nodes. As elaborated in Appendix A, unreliable
broadcast can be performed using a set of spanning trees embedded in graph Gk. Now let us
analyze the time required to perform unreliable broadcast in Phase 1.
MINCUT(Gk, 1, j) denotes the minimum cut in the directed graph Gk from source node 1 to
node j. Let us define
γk = min
j∈Vk
MINCUT(Gk, 1, j).
MINCUT(Gk, 1, j) is equal to the maximum flow rate possible from node 1 to node j ∈ Vk. It is
well-known [17] that γk is the maximum rate achievable for unreliable broadcast from node 1 to
all the other nodes inVk, under the capacity constraints on the links in Ek. Thus, the least amount
of time in which L bits can be broadcast by node 1 in graph Gk is given by
1
L / γk (2)
Clearly, γk depends on the capacities of the links in Gk. For example, if Gk were the directed graph
in Figure 1(a), then MINCUT(Gk, 1, 2) = MINCUT(Gk, 1, 4) = 2, MINCUT(Gk, 1, 3) = 3, and hence
γk = 2.
At the end of the broadcast operation in Phase 1, each node should have received L bits. At the
end of Phase 1 of the k-th instance of NAB, one of the following four outcomes will occur:
(i) The source node 1 is fault-free, and all the fault-free nodes correctly receive the source node’s
L-bit input for the k-th instance of NAB, or
(ii) The source node 1 is fault-free, but some of the fault-free nodes receive incorrect L-bit values
due to misbehavior by some faulty node(s), or
(iii) The source node 1 is faulty, but all the fault-free nodes still receive an identical L-bit value in
Phase 1, or
(iv) The source node is faulty, and all the fault-free nodes do not receive an identical L-bit value
in Phase 1.
The values received by the fault-free nodes in cases (i) and (iii) satisfy the agreement and validity
conditions, whereas in cases (ii) and (iv) at least one of the two conditions is violated.
Phase 2: Failure Detection
Phase 2 performs the following two operations. As stipulated in the fault model, a faulty node
may not follow the algorithm specification correctly.
• (Step 2.1) Equality check: Using an Equality Check algorithm, the nodes in Vk perform a
comparison of the L-bit value they received in Phase 1, to determine if all the nodes received
an identical value. The source node 1 also participates in this comparison operation (treating
its input as the value “received from” itself).
1To simplify the analysis, we ignore propagation delays. Analogous results on throughput and
capacity can be obtained in the presence of propagation delays as well.
4
Section 3 presents the Equality Check algorithm, which is designed to guarantee that if the
values received by the fault-free nodes in Phase 1 are not identical, then at least one fault-free
node will detect the mismatch.
• (Step 2.2) Agreeing on the outcome of equality check: Using a previously proposed Byzantine
broadcast algorithm, such as [19], each node performs Byzantine broadcast of a 1-bit flag to
other nodes in Gk indicating whether it detected a mismatch during Equality Check.
If any node broadcasts in step 2.2 that it has detected a mismatch, then subsequently Phase 3
is performed. On the other hand, if no node announces a mismatch in step 2.2 above, then Phase
3 is not performed; in this case, each fault-free node agrees on the value it received in Phase 1, and
the k-th instance of NAB is completed.
We will later prove that, when Phase 3 is not performed, the values agreed above by the fault-
free nodes satisfy the validity and agreement conditions for the k-th instance of NAB. On the other
hand, when Phase 3 is performed during the k-th instance of NAB, as noted below, Phase 3 results
in correct outcome for the k-th instance.
When Phase 3 is performed, Phase 3 determines Gk+1. Otherwise, Gk+1 = Gk.
Phase 3: Dispute Control
Phase 3 employs a dispute control mechanism that has also been used in prior work [1, 15].
Appendix B provides the details of the dispute control algorithm used in Phase 3. Here we
summarize the outcomes of this phase – this summary should suffice for understanding the main
contributions of this paper.
The dispute control in Phase 3 has very high overhead, due to the large amount of data that
needs to be transmitted. From the above discussion of Phase 2, it follows that Phase 3 is performed
only if at least one faulty node misbehaves during Phases 1 or 2. The outcomes from Phase 3
performed during the k-th instance of NAB are as follows.
• Phase 3 results in correct Byzantine broadcast for the k-th instance of NAB. This is obtained
as a byproduct of the Dispute Control mechanism.
• By the end of Phase 3, either one of the nodes in Vk is correctly identified as faulty, or/and
at least one pair of nodes inVk, say nodes a, b, is identified as being “in dispute” with each
other. When a node pair a, b is found in dispute, it is guaranteed that (i) at least one of these
two nodes is faulty, and (ii) at least one of the directed edges (a, b) and (b, a) is in Ek. Note
that the dispute control phase never finds two fault-free nodes in dispute with each other.
• Phase 3 in the k-th instance computes graphGk+1. In particular, any nodes that can be inferred
as being faulty based on their behavior so far are excluded fromVk+1; links attached to such
nodes are excluded from Ek+1. In Appendix B we elaborate on how the faulty nodes are
identified. Then, for each node pair in Vk+1, if that node pair has been found in dispute at
least in one instance of NAB so far, the links between the node pair are excluded from Ek+1.
Phase 3 ensures that all the fault-free nodes compute an identical graph Gk+1 = (Vk+1,Ek+1)
to be used during the next instance of NAB.
Consider two special cases for the k-th instance of NAB:
• If graph Gk does not contain the source node 1, it implies that all the fault-free nodes are
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aware that node 1 is faulty. In this case, they can safely agree on a default value as the
outcome for the k-th instance of NAB.
• Similarly, if the source node is in Gk but at least f other nodes are excluded from Gk, that
implies that the remaining nodes in Gk are all fault-free; in this case, algorithm NAB can be
reduced to just Phase 1.
Observe that during each execution of Phase 3, either a newpair of nodes in dispute is identified,
or a new node is identified as faulty. Once a node is found to be in dispute with f + 1 distinct
nodes, it can be identified as faulty, and excluded from the algorithm’s execution. Therefore,
Dispute Control needs to be performed at most f ( f + 1) times over repeated executions of NAB.
Thus, even though each dispute control phase is expensive, the bounded number ensures that the
amortized cost over a large number of instances of NAB is small, as reflected in the performance
analysis of NAB (in Section 5 and Appendix D).
3 Equality Check Algorithm with Parameter ρk
We now present the Equality Check algorithm used in Phase 2, which has an integer parameter
ρk for the k-th instance of NAB. Later in this section, we will elaborate on the choice of ρk, which
is dependent on capacities of the links in Gk.
Let us denote by xi the L-bit value received by fault-free node i ∈ Vk in Phase 1 of the k-th
instance. For simplicity, we do not include index k in the notation xi. To simplify the presentation,
let us assume that L/ρk is an integer. Thus we can represent the L-bit value xi as ρk symbols from
Galois Field GF(2L/ρk). In particular, we represent xi as a vector Xi,
Xi = [Xi(1), Xi(2), · · · ,Xi(ρk)]
where each symbol Xi( j) ∈ GF(2
L/ρk) can be represented using L/ρk bits. As discussed earlier, for
convenience, we assume that all the link capacities are integers when using a suitable time unit.
Algorithm 1 Equality Check in Gk with parameter ρk
Each node i ∈ Vk should performs these steps:
1. On each outgoing link e = (i, j) ∈ Ek whose capacity is ze, node i transmits ze linear combi-
nations of the ρk symbols in vector Xi, with the weights for the linear combinations being
chosen from GF(2L/ρk).
More formally, for each outgoing edge e = (i, j) ∈ Ek of capacity ze, a ρk × ze matrix Ce is
specified as a part of the algorithm. Entries in Ce are chosen from GF(2
L/ρk). Node i sends to
node j a vector Ye of ze symbols obtained as the matrix product Ye = XiCe. Each element of
Ye is said to be a “coded symbol”. The choice of the matrix Ce affects the correctness of the
algorithm, as elaborated later.
2. On each incoming edge d = ( j, i) ∈ Ek, node i receives a vector Yd containing zd symbols from
GF(2L/ρk). Node i then checks, for each incoming edge d, whether Yd = XiCd. The check is
said to fail iff Yd , XiCd.
3. If checks of symbols received on any incoming edge fail in the previous step, then node i sets
a 1-bit flag equal to MISMATCH; else the flag is set to NULL. This flag is broadcast in Step 2.2
above.
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In the Equality Check algorithm, ze symbols of size L/ρk bits are transmitted on each link e of
capacity ze. Therefore, the Equality Check algorithm requires time duration
L / ρk (3)
Salient Feature of Equality Check Algorithm
In the Equality Check algorithm, a single round of communication occurs between adjacent
nodes. No node is required to forward packets received from other nodes during the Equality
Check algorithm. This implies that, while a faulty nodemay send incorrect packets to its neighbors,
it cannot tamper information sent between fault-free nodes. This feature of Equality Check is
important in being able to prove its correctness despite the presence of faulty nodes in Gk.
Choice of Parameter ρk
We define a setΩk as follows using the disputes identified through the first (k − 1) instances of
NAB.
Ωk = { H | H is a subgraph of Gk containing (n − f ) nodes such that no two nodes in H
have been found in dispute through the first (k − 1) instances of NAB }
As noted in the discussion of Phase 3 (Dispute Control), fault-free nodes are never found in dispute
with each other (fault-free nodesmay be found in disputewith faulty nodes, however). This implies
that Gk includes all the fault-free nodes, since a fault-free node will never be found in dispute with
f + 1 other nodes. There are at least n − f fault-free nodes in the network. This implies that setΩk
is non-empty.
Corresponding to a directed graphH(V,E), let us define an undirected graphH(V,E) as follows:
(i) both H and H contain the same set of vertices, (ii) undirected edge (i, j) ∈ E if either (i, j) ∈ E
or ( j, i) ∈ E, and (iii) capacity of undirected edge (i, j) ∈ E is defined to be equal to the sum of the
capacities of directed links (i, j) and ( j, i) in E (if a directed link does not exist in E, here we treat its
capacity as 0). For example, Figure 2(b) shows the undirected graph corresponding to the directed
graph in Figure 2(a).
Define a set of undirected graphsΩk as follows. Ωk contains undirected version of each directed
graph in Ω.
Ωk = { H | H ∈ Ωk }
DefineUk = minH∈Ωk
mini, j∈H MINCUT(H, i, j) as the minimum value of theMINCUTs between all
pairs of nodes in all the undirected graphs in the setΩk. For instance, suppose that n = 4, f = 1 and
the graph shown in Figure 1(a) is G, whereas Gk is the graph shown in Figure 1(b). Thus, nodes 2
and 3 have been found in dispute previously. Then, Ωk and Ωk each contain two subgraphs, one
subgraph corresponding to the node set {1, 2, 4}, and the other subgraph corresponding to the node
set {1, 3, 4}. In this example, Uk = 2. Also notice that in this example, there is no edge between
nodes 2 and 4 in G to begin with – so these two nodes will never be found in dispute.
Parameter ρk is chosen such that
ρk ≤
Uk
2
Under the above constraint on ρk, as per (3), execution time of Equality Check is minimized when
ρk =
Uk
2 . Under the above constraint on ρk, we will prove the correctness of the Equality Check
algorithm, with its execution time being L/ρk.
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3.1 Correctness of the Equality Check Algorithm
The correctness of Algorithm 1 depends on the choices of the parameter ρk and the set of coding
matrices {Ce|e ∈ Ek}. Let us say that a set of coding matrices is correct if the resulting Equality Check
Algorithm 1 satisfies the following requirement:
• (EC) if there exists a pair of fault-free nodes i, j ∈ Gk such that Xi , Xj (i.e., xi , x j),
then the 1-bit flag at at least one fault-free node is set to MISMATCH.
Recall that Xi is a vector representation of the L-bit value xi received by node i in Phase 1 of NAB.
Two consequences of the above correctness condition are:
• If some node (possibly the source node) misbehaves during Phase 1 leading to outcomes (ii)
or (iv) for Phase 1, then at least one fault-free node will set its flag to MISMATCH. In this
case, the fault-free nodes (possibly including the sender) do not share identical L-bit values
Xi’s as the outcome of Phase 1.
• If no misbehavior occurs in Phase 1 (thus the values received by fault-free nodes in Phase
1 are correct), but MISMATCH flag at some fault-free node is set in Equality Check, then
misbehavior must have occurred in Phase 2.
The following theorem shows that when ρk ≤ Uk/2, and when L is sufficiently large, there
exists a set coding matrices {Ce|e ∈ Ek} that are correct.
Theorem 1 For ρk ≤ Uk/2, when the entries of the coding matrices {Ce|e ∈ Ek} in step 1 of Algorithm 1 are
chosen independently and uniformly at random from GF(2L/ρk), then {Ce|e ∈ Ek} is correct with probability
≥ 1 − 2−L/ρk
[( n
n− f
)
(n − f − 1)ρk
]
. Note that when L is large enough, 1 − 2−L/ρk
[( n
n− f
)
(n − f − 1)ρk
]
> 0.
Proof Sketch: The detailed proof is presented in Appendix C. Here we provide a sketch of the
proof. The goal is to prove that property (EC) above holds with a non-zero probability. That is,
regardless of which (up to f ) nodes in G are faulty, when Xi , Xj for some pair of fault-free nodes
i and j in Gk during the k-th instance, at least one fault-free node (which may be different from
nodes i and j) will set its 1-bit flag to MISMATCH. To prove this, we consider every subgraph of
H ∈ Ωk (see definition of Ωk above). By definition of Ωk, no two nodes in H have been found in
dispute through the first (k− 1) instances of NAB. Therefore,H represents one potential set of n− f
fault-free nodes in Gk. For each edge e = (i, j) in H, steps 1-2 of Algorithm 1 together have the
effect of checking whether or not (Xi−Xj)Ce = 0. Without loss of generality, for the purpose of this
proof, rename the nodes in H as 1, · · · , n − f . Denote Di = Xi − Xn−f for i = 1, · · · , (n − f − 1), then
(Xi − Xj)Ce = 0 ⇔

(Di −Dj)Ce = 0 , if i, j < n − f ;
DiCe = 0 , if j = n − f ;
−DjCe = 0 , if i = n − f.
(4)
Define DH = [D1,D2, · · · ,Dn−f−1]. Let m be the sum of the capacities of all the directed edges
inH. As elaborated in Appendix C, we define CH to be a (n− f − 1)ρk ×mmatrix whose entries are
obtained using the elements of Ce for each edge e in H in an appropriate manner. For the suitably
defined CH matrix, we can show that the comparisons in steps 1-2 of Algorithm 1 at all the nodes
in H ∈ Ωk are equivalent to checking whether or not
DH CH = 0. (5)
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We can show that for a particular subgraph H ∈ Ωk, when ρk ≤ Uk/2, m ≥ (n − f − 1)ρk; and when
the set of coding matrices {Ce|e ∈ Ek} are generated as described in Theorem 1, for large enough
L, with non-zero probability CH contains a (n − f − 1)ρk × (n − f − 1)ρk square submatrix that is
invertible. In this case DHCH = 0 if and only if DH = 0, i.e., X1 = X2 = · · · = Xn−f. In other words,
if all nodes in subgraph H are fault-free, and Xi , Xj for two fault-free nodes i, j, then DHCH , 0
and hence the check in step 2 of Algorithm 1 fails at some fault-free node in H.
We can then show that, for large enough L, with a non-zero probability, this is also simultane-
ously true for all subgraphsH ∈ Ωk. This implies that, for large enough L, correct coding matrices
(Ce for each e ∈ Ek) can be found. These coding matrices are specified as a part of the algorithm
specification. Further details of the proof are in Appendix C. 
4 Correctness of NAB
For Phase 1 (Unreliable Broadcast) and Phase 3 (Dispute Control), the proof that the outcomes
claimed in Section 2 indeed occur follows directly from the prior literature cited in Section 2 (and
elaborated in Appendices A and B). Now consider two cases:
• The values received by the fault-free nodes in Phase 1 are not identical: Then the correctness
of Equality Check ensures that a fault-free node will detect the mismatch, and consequently
Phase 3 will be performed. As a byproduct ofDispute Control in Phase 3, the fault-free nodes
will correctly agree on a value that satisfies the validity and agreement conditions.
• The values received by the fault-free nodes in Phase 1 are identical: If no node announces
a mismatch in step 2.2, then the fault-free nodes will agree on the value received in Phase
1. It is easy to see that this is a correct outcome. On the other hand, if some (faulty) node
announces a mismatch in step 2.2, then Dispute Control will be performed, which will result
in correct outcome for the broadcast of the k-th instance.
Thus, in all cases, NAB will lead to correct outcome in each instance.
5 Throughput of NAB and Capacity of BB
5.1 A Lower Bound on Throughput of NAB for Large Q and L
In this section, we provide the intuition behind the derivation of the lower bound. More detail
is presented in Appendix D.We prove the lower boundwhen the number of instancesQ and input
size L for each instance are both “large” (in an order sense) compared to n. Two consequences of
L and Q being large:
• As a consequence of Q being large, the average overhead of Dispute control per instance of
NAB becomes negligible. Recall that Dispute Control needs to be performed at most f ( f + 1)
times over Q executions of NAB.
• As a consequence of L being large, the overhead of 1-bit broadcasts performed in step 2.2 of
Phase 2 becomes negligible when amortized over the L bits being broadcast by the source in
each instance of NAB.
It then suffices to consider only the time it takes to complete theUnreliable broadcast in Phase 1 and
Equality Check in Phase 2. For the k-th instance of NAB, as discussed previously, the unreliable
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broadcast in Phase 1 can be done in L/γk time units (see definition of γk in section 2.). We now
define
Γ = { H | H is a subgraph of G containing source node 1,
and Gk may equal J in some execution of NAB for some k }
Appendix E provides a systematic construction of the set Γ. Define the minimum value of all
possible γk:
γ∗ = min
Gk∈Γ
γk = min
Gk∈Γ
min
j∈Vk
MINCUT(Gk, 1, j).
Then an upper bound of the execution time of Phase 1 in all instances of NAB is L/γ∗.
With parameter ρk = Uk/2, the execution time of the Equality Check in Phase 2 is L/ρk. Recall
that Uk is defined as the minimum value of the MINCUTs between all pairs of nodes in all
undirected graphs in the set Ωk. As discussed in Appendix C.2, Ωk ⊆ Ω1, where G1 = G. Hence
Uk ≥ U1 in all possible Gk. Define
ρ∗ =
U1
2
= min
H∈Ω1
min
nodes i, j in H
MINCUT(H, i, j).
Then ρk ≥ ρ
∗ for all possible Gk and the execution time of the Equality Check is upper-bounded by
L/ρ∗. So the throughput of NAB for large Q and L can be lower bounded by2
lim
L→∞
T(G, L,NAB) ≥
L
L/γ∗ + L/ρ∗
=
γ∗ρ∗
γ∗ + ρ∗
. (6)
5.2 An Upper Bound on Capacity of BB
Theorem 2 In any point-to-point network G(V,E), the capacity of Byzantine broadcast (CBB) with node
1 as the source satisfies the following upper bound
CBB(G) ≤ min(γ
∗, 2ρ∗).
Appendix F presents a proof of this upper bound. Given the throughput lower bound TNAB(G)
in (6) and the upper bound on CBB(G) from Theorem 2, as shown in Appendix G, the result below
can be obtained.
Theorem 3 For graph G(V,E):
lim
L→∞
T(G, L,NAB) ≥ min(γ∗, 2ρ∗)/3 ≥ CBB(G)/3.
Moreover, when γ∗ ≤ ρ∗:
lim
L→∞
T(G, L,NAB) ≥ min(γ∗, 2ρ∗)/2 ≥ CBB(G)/2.
2To simplify the analysis above, we ignored propagation delays. Appendix D describes how to
achieve this bound even when propagation delays are considered.
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6 Conclusion
This paper presents NAB, a network-aware Byzantine broadcast algorithm for point-to-point
networks. We derive an upper bound on the capacity of Byzantine broadcast, and show that
NAB can achieve throughput at least 1/3 fraction of the capacity over a large number of execution
instances, when L is large. The fraction can be improved to at least 1/2 when the network satisfies
an additional condition.
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Appendices
A Unreliable Broadcast in Phase 1
According to [16], in a given graphGk with γk = min j∈Vk MINCUT(Gk, 1, j), there always exist a
set of γk unit-capacity spanning trees ofGk such that the total usage on each edge e ∈ Ek by all the γk
spanning trees combined is no more than its link capacity ze. Each spanning tree is “unit-capacity”
in the sense that 1 unit capacity of each link on that tree is allocated for transmissions on that
tree. For example, Figure 2(c) shows 2 unit-capacity spanning trees that can be embedded in the
directed graph in Figure 2(a): one spanning tree is shownwith solid edges and the other spanning
tree is shown in dotted edges. Observe that link (1,2) is used by both spanning trees, each tree
using a unit capacity on link (1,2), for a total usage of 2 units, which is the capacity of link (1,2).
To broadcast an L-bit value from source node 1, we represent the L-bit value as γk symbols,
each symbol being represented using L/γk bits. One symbol (L/γk bits) is then transmitted along
each of the γk unit-capacity spanning trees.
B Dispute Control
The dispute control algorithm is performed in the k-th instance of NAB only if at least one node
misbehaves during Phases 1 or 2. The goal of dispute control is to learn some information about
the identity of at least one faulty node. In particular, the dispute control algorithm will identify a
new node as being faulty, or/and identify a new node pair in dispute (at least one of the nodes in
the pair is guaranteed to be faulty). The steps in dispute control in the k-th instance of NAB are as
follows:
• (DC1) Each node i in Vk uses a previously proposed Byzantine broadcast algorithm, such
as [6], to broadcast to all other nodes in Vk all the messages that this node i claims to have
received from other nodes, and sent to the other nodes, during Phases 1 and 2 of the k-th
instance. Source node 1 also uses an existing Byzantine broadcast algorithm [6] to broadcast
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its L-bit input for the k-th instance to all the other nodes. Thus, at the end of this step, all the
fault-free nodes will reach correct agreement for the output for the k-th instance.
• (DC2) If for some node pair a, b ∈ Vk, a message that node a claims above to have sent to
node bmismatches with the claim of receivedmessagesmade by node b, then node pair a, b is
found in dispute. In step DC1, since a Byzantine broadcast algorithm is used to disseminate
the claims, all the fault-free nodes will identify identical node pairs in dispute.
It should be clear that a pair of fault-free nodes will never be found in dispute with each
other in this step.
• (DC3) The NAB algorithm is deterministic in nature. Therefore, the messages that should be
sent by each node in Phases 1 and 2 can be completely determined by the messages that the
node receives, and, in case of node 1, its initial input. Thus, if the claims of the messages sent
by some node i are inconsistent with the message it claims to have received, and its initial
input (in case of node 1), then that node imust be faulty. Again, all fault-free nodes identify
these faulty nodes identically. Any nodes thus identified as faulty until now (including all
previous instances of NAB) are deemed to be “in dispute” with all their neighbors (to whom
the faulty nodes have incoming or outgoing links).
It should be clear that a fault-free node will never be found to be faulty in this step.
• (DC4) Consider the node pairs that have been identified as being in dispute in DC2 and DC3
of at least one instances of NAB so far.
We will say that a set of nodes Fi, where |Fi| ≤ f , “explains” all the disputes so far, if for each
pair a, b found in dispute so far, at least one of a and b is in Fi. It should be easy to see that
for any set of disputes that may be observed, there must be at least one such set that explains
the disputes. It is easy to argue that the nodes in the set below must be necessarily faulty (in
fact, the nodes in the set intersection below are also guaranteed to include nodes identified
as faulty in step DC3).
∆⋂
δ=1
Fδ
Then,Vk+1 is obtained asVk −
⋂∆
δ=1 Fδ. Ek+1 is obtained by removing from Ek edges incident
on nodes in
⋂∆
δ=1 Fδ, and also excluding edges between node pairs that have been found in
dispute so far.
As noted earlier, the above dispute control phase may be executed in at most f ( f + 1) instances
of NAB.
C Proof of Theorem 1
To prove Theorem 1, we first prove that when the coding matrices are generated at random
as described, for a particular subgraph H ∈ Ωk, with non-zero probability, the coding matrices
{Ce|e ∈ Gk} defines a matrix CH (as defined later) such that DHCH = 0 if and only if DH = 0. Then
we prove that this is also simultaneously true for all subgraphs H ∈ Ωk.
C.1 For a given subgraph H ∈ Ωk
Consider any subgraph H ∈ Ωk. For each edge e = (i, j) in H, we “expand” the corresponding
coding matrix Ce (of size ρk × ze) to a (n − f − 1)ρk × ze matrix Be as follows: Be consists n − f − 1
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blocks, each block is a ρk × ze matrix:
• If i , n − f and j , n − f , then the i-th and j-th block equal to Ce and −Ce, respectively. The
other blocks are all set to 0.
Be
T =
( i j
0 · · · 0 Ce
T 0 · · · 0 −Ce
T 0 · · · 0
)
Here ()T denotes the transpose of a matrix or vector.
• If i = n − f , then the j-th block equals to −Ce, and the other blocks are all set to 0 matrix.
Be
T =
( j
0 · · · 0 −Ce
T 0 · · · 0
)
• If j = n − f , then the i-th block equals to Ce, and the other blocks are all set to 0 matrix.
Be
T =
( i
0 · · · 0 Ce
T 0 · · · 0
)
LetDi,β = Xi(β)−Xn− f (β) for i < n− f as the difference between Xi and Xn−f in the β-th element.
Recall that Di = Xi − Xn−f =
(
Di,1 · · · Di,ρk
)
and DH =
(
D1 · · · Dn−f−1
)
. So DH is a row vector
of (n − f − 1)ρk elements from GF(2
L/ρk) that captures the differences between Xi and Xn−f for all
i < n − f . It should be easy to see that
(Xi − Xj)Ce = 0 ⇔ DHBe = 0.
So for edge e, steps 1-2 of Algorithm 1 have the effect of checking whether or not DHBe = 0.
If we label the set of edges inH as e1, e2, · · · , and letm be the sum of the capacities of all edges in
H, then we construct a (n− f − 1)ρk ×mmatrix CH by concatenating all expanded coding matrices:
CH =
(
Be1 Be2 · · ·
)
,
where each column of CH represents one coded symbol sent in H over the corresponding edge.
Then steps 1-2 of Algorithm 1 for all edges in H have the same effect of checking whether or not
DHCH = 0. So to prove Theorem 1, we need to show that there exists at least one CH such that
DHCH = 0 ⇔ DH = 0.
It is obvious that if DH = 0, then DHCH = 0 for any CH. So all left to show is that there exists
at least one CH such that DHCH = 0 ⇒ DH = 0. It is then sufficient to show that CH contains
a (n − f − 1)ρk × (n − f − 1)ρk submatrix MH that is invertible, because when such an invertible
submatrix exist,
DHCH = 0 ⇒ DHMH = 0 ⇒ DH = 0.
Now we describe how one such submatrix MH can be obtains. Notice that each column of CH
represents one coded symbol sent on the corresponding edge. A (n− f −1)ρk× (n− f −1) submatrix
S of CH is said to be a “spanning matrix” ofH if the edges corresponding to the columns of S form
a undirected spanning tree ofH – the undirected representation of H. In Figure 2(d), an undirected
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spanning tree of the undirected graph in Figure 2(b) is shown in dotted edges. It is worth pointing
out that an undirected spanning tree in an undirected graphH does not necessarily correspond to
a directed spanning tree in the corresponding directed graphH. For example, the directed edges in
Figure 2(a) corresponding to the dotted undirected edges in Figure 2(d) do not consist a spanning
tree in the directed graph in Figure 2(a).
It is known that in an undirected graph whose MINCUT equals to U, at least U/2 undirected
unit-capacity spanning trees can be embedded [16]3 This implies that CH contains a set of Uk/2
spanningmatrices such that no two spanningmatrices in the set covers the same column in CH. Let
{S1, · · · ,Sρk} be one set of ρk ≤ Uk/2 such spanning matrices of H. Then union of these spanning
matrices forms an (n − f − 1)ρk × (n − f − 1)ρk submatrix of CH:
MH =
(
S1 · · · Sρk
)
.
Next, wewill show that when the set of codingmatrices are generated as described in Theorem
1, with non-zero probability we obtain an invertible square matrix MH. When MH is invertible,
DHMH = 0 ⇔ DH = 0 ⇔ X1 = · · · = Xn−f.
For the following discussion, it is convenient to reorder the elements of DH into
D˜H =
(
D1,1 · · · Dn− f−1,1 D1,2 · · · Dn− f−1,2 · · · D1,ρk · · · Dn− f−1,ρk
)
,
so that the (β− 1)(n − f − 1)+ 1-th through the β(n− f − 1) elements of D˜H represent the difference
between Xi (i = 1, · · · , n − f − 1) and Xn−f in the β-th element.
We also reorder the rows of each spanning matrix Sq (q = 1, · · · , ρk) accordingly. It can be
showed that after reordering, Sq becomes S˜q and has the following structure:
S˜q =

AqSq,1
AqSq,2
...
AqSq,ρk

. (7)
Here Aq is a (n − f − 1) × (n − f − 1) square matrix, and it is called the adjacency matrix of the
spanning tree corresponding to Sq. Aq is formed as follows. Suppose that the r-th column of Sq
corresponds to a coded symbol sent over a directed edge (i, j) in H, then
1. If i , n − f and j , n − f , then the r-th column of Aq has the i-th element as 1 and the j-th
element as -1, the remaining entries in that column are all 0;
2. If i = n− f , then the j-th element of the r-th column of Aq is set to -1, the remaining elements
of that column are all 0;
3. If j = n − f , then the i-th element of the r-th column of Aq is set to 1, the remaining elements
of that column are all 0.
3The definition of embedding undirected unit-capacity spanning trees in undirected graphs is
similar to embedding directed unit-capacity spanning trees in directed graphs (by dropping the
direction of edges).
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For example, suppose H is the graph shown in Figure 2(b), and Sq corresponds to a spanning
tree of H consisting of the dotted edges in Figure 2(d). Suppose that we index the corresponding
directed edges in the graph shown in Figure 2(a) in the following order: (2,3), (1,4), (4,3). The
resulting adjacency matrix Aq =

0 1 0
1 0 0
−1 0 −1
.
On the other hand, each (n − f − 1) × (n − f − 1) square matrix Sq,p is a diagonal matrix. The
r-th diagonal element of Sq,p equals to the p-th coefficient used to compute the coded symbol
corresponding to the r-th column of Sq. For example, suppose the first column of Sq corresponds
to a coded packet X1(1) + 2X1(2) being sent on link (1, 2). Then the first diagonal elements of Sq,1
and Sq,2 are 1 and 2, respectively.
So after reordering, MH can be written as M˜H that has the following structure:
M˜H =

A1S1,1 A2S2,1 · · · AρkCρk,ρk
A1S1,2 A2S2,2 · · · AρkCρk,ρk
...
. . .
...
A1S1,ρk A2S2,ρk · · · AρkSρk,ρk

(8)
Notice that M˜H is obtained by permuting the rows of MH. So to show that MH being invertible is
equivalent to M˜H being invertible.
Define Mq =

A1S1,1 · · · AqSq,1
...
. . .
...
A1S1,q · · · AqSq,q
 for 1 ≤ q ≤ ρk. Note that Mq1 is a sub-matrix of Mq2 when
q1 < q2, and Mρk = M˜H. We prove the following lemma:
Lemma 1 For any ρk ≤ Uk/2, with probability at least
(
1 −
n− f−1
2L/ρk
)ρk
, matrix M˜H is invertible. Hence MH
is also invertible.
Proof: We now show that each Mq is invertible with probability at least
(
1 −
n− f−1
2L/ρk
)q
for all q ≤ ρk.
The proof is done by induction, with q = 1 being the base case.
Base Case – q = 1:
M1 = A1S1,1. (9)
As showed later inAppendixC.3,Aq is always invertible anddet(Aq) = ±1. SinceS1,1 is a (n− f−1)-
by-(n− f − 1) diagonal matrix, it is invertible provided that all its (n− f − 1) diagonal elements are
non-zero. Remember that the diagonal elements of S1,1 are chosen uniformly and independently
from GF(2L/ρk). The probability that they are all non-zero is
(
1 − 1
2L/ρk
)n− f−1
≥ 1 −
n− f−1
2L/ρk
.
Induction Step – q to q + 1 ≤ ρk: The square matrix Mq+1 can be written as
Mq+1 =
(
Mq Pq
Fq Aq+1Sq+1,q+1
)
, (10)
where
Pq =

Aq+1Sq+1,1
Aq+1Sq+1,1
...
Aq+1Sq+1,q

(11)
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is an (n − f − 1)q-by-(n − f − 1) matrix, and
Fq =
(
A1S1,k+1 · · · AqSq,q+1
)
(12)
is an (n − f − 1)-by-(n − f − 1)qmatrix.
Assuming that Mq is invertible, we transform Mq+1 as follows:
M′q+1 =
(
I(n−f−1)q 0
0 A−1
q+1
)
Mk+1
(
I(n−f−1)q −M
−1
q Pq
0 I(n−f−1)
)
(13)
=
(
I(n−f−1)q 0
0 A−1
q+1
) (
Mq Pq
Fq Aq+1Sq+1,q+1
) (
I(n−f−1)q −M
−1
q Pq
0 I(n−f−1)
)
(14)
=
(
Mq 0
A−1
q+1
Fq Sq+1,q+1 −A
−1
q+1
FqM
−1
q Pq
)
. (15)
Here I(n−f−1)q and I(n−f−1) each denote a (n − f − 1)q × (n − f − 1)q and a (n − f − 1) × (n − f − 1)
identity matrices. Note that |det(M′
k+1
)| = |det(Mk+1)|, since the matrix multiplied at the left has
determinant ±1, and the matrix multiplied at the right has determinant 1.
Observe that the diagonal elements of the (n − f − 1) × (n − f − 1) diagonal matrix Sq+1,q+1 are
chosen independently from A−1
q+1
FqM
−1
q Pq. Then it can be proved that Sq+1,q+1 − A
−1
q+1
FqM
−1
q Pq is
invertible with probability at least 1−
n− f−1
2L/ρk
(See Appendix C.4.) given that Mq is invertible, which
happens with probability at least
(
1 −
n− f−1
2L/ρk
)q
according to the induction assumption. So we have
Pr{Mq+1 is invertible} ≥
(
1 −
n − f − 1
2L/ρk
)q (
1 −
n − f − 1
2L/ρk
)
=
(
1 −
n − f − 1
2L/ρk
)q+1
. (16)
This completes the induction. Now we can see that Mρk = M˜H is invertible with probability
≥
(
1 −
n − f − 1
2L/ρk
)ρk
≥ 1 −
(n − f − 1)ρk
2L/ρk
→ 1, as L→∞. (17)

Nowwe have proved that there exists a set of codingmatrices {Ce|e ∈ Ek} such that the resulting
CH satisfies the condition that DHCH = 0 if and only if DH = 0.
C.2 For all subgraphs in Ωk
In this section, we are going to show that, forGk, if the codingmatrices {Ce|e ∈ Ek} are generated
as described in Theorem 1, then with non-zero probability the set of square matrices {MH|H ∈ Ωk}
are all invertible simultaneously. When this is true, there exists a set of coding matrices that is
correct.
To show that MH’s for all H ∈ Ωk are simultaneously invertible with non-zero probability, we
consider the product of all these square matrices:∏
H∈Ωk
MH.
According to Lemma 1, each MH (H ∈ Ωk) is invertible with non-zero probability. It implies that
det(MH) is a non-identically-zero polynomial of the random coding coefficients of degree at most
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(n − f − 1)ρk (Recall that MH is a square matrix of size (n − f − 1)ρk.). So
det

∏
H∈Ωk
MH
 =
∏
H∈Ωk
det (MH)
is a non-identically-zero polynomial of the random coefficients of degree at most |Ωk|(n − f − 1)ρk.
Notice that each coded symbol is used once in each subgraph H. So each random coefficient
appears in at most one column in each MH. It follows that the largest exponent of any random
coefficient in det
(∏
H∈Ωk
MH
)
is at most |Ωk|.
According to Lemma 1 of [8], the probability that det
(∏
H∈Ωk
MH
)
is non-zero is at least
(
1 − 2−L/ρk |Ωk|
)(n− f−1)ρk
≥ 1 − 2−L/ρk
[
|Ωk|(n − f − 1)ρk
]
.
According to the way Gk is constructed and the definition of Ωk, it should not be hard to see that
Gk is a subgraph of G1 = G, and Ωk ⊆ Ω1. Notice that |Ω1| =
( n
n− f
)
. So |Ωk| ≤
( n
n− f
)
and Theorem 1
follows.
C.3 Proof of Aq being Invertible
Given an adjacency matrix Aq, let us call the corresponding spanning tree ofH as Tq. For edges
in Tq incident on node n − f , the corresponding columns in Aq have exactly one non-zero entry.
Also, the column corresponding to an edge that is incident on node i has a non-zero entry in row
i. Since there must be at least one edge in Tq that is incident on node n − f , there must be at least
one column of Aq that has only one non-zero element. Also, since every node is incident on at
least one edge in Tq, every row of Aq has at least one non-zero element(s). Since there is at most
one edge between every pair of nodes in Tq, no two columns in Aq are non-zero in identical rows.
Therefore, by column manipulation, we can transform matrix Aq into another matrix in which
every row and every column has exactly one non-zero element. Hence det(Aq) equals to either 1
or −1, and Aq is invertible.
C.4 Proof of Sq+1,q+1 −A
−1
q+1FqM
−1
q Pq being Invertible
Consider W be an arbitrary fixed w × w matrix. Consider a random w × w diagonal matrix S
with w diagonal elements s1, · · · , sw.
S =

s1 0 · · · 0
0 s2 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0 sw

(18)
The diagonal elements of S are selected independently and uniformly randomly from GF(2ρk).
Then we have:
Lemma 2 The probability that the w × w matrix S −W is invertible is lower bounded by:
Pr{(S −W) is invertible} ≥ 1 −
w
2ρk
. (19)
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Proof: Consider the determinant of matrix S −W.
det(S − W) = det

(s1 −W1,1) −R1,2 · · · −W1,w
−R2,1 (s2 −W2,2) · · · −R2,w
...
. . .
...
−Rw,1 · · · −Ww,w−1 (sr − Rw,w)

(20)
= (s1 −W1,1)(s2 −W2,2) · · · (sw −Ww,w) + other terms (21)
= Πwi=1si + Ww− (22)
The first term above,Πw
i=1
si, is a degree-wpolynomial of s1, · · · , sw. Ww− is a polynomial of degree at
mostw−1 of s1, · · · , sw, and it represents the remaining terms in det(S−W). Notice that det(S−W)
cannot be identically zero since it contains only one degree-w term. Then by the Schwartz-Zippel
Theorem, the probability that det(S − R) = 0 is ≤ w/2ρk . Since S − W is invertible if and only if
det(S −W) , 0, we conclude that
Pr{(S −W) is invertible} ≥ 1 −
w
2ρk
(23)
By setting S = Sq+1,q+1, W = A
−1
q+1
FqM
−1
q Pq, and w = n − f − 1, we prove that Sq+1,q+1 −
A−1
q+1
FqM
−1
q Pq is invertible with probability at least 1 −
n− f−1
2L/ρk
. 
D Throughput of NAB
First consider the time cost of each operation in instance k of NAB :
• Phase 1: It takes L/γk ≤ L/γ
∗ time units, since unreliable broadcast from the source node 1 at
rate γk is achievable and γk ≥ γ
∗, as discussed in Appendix A.
• Phase 2 – Equality check: As discussed previously, it takes L/ρk ≤ L/ρ
∗ time units.
• Phase 2 – Broadcasting outcomes of equality check: To reliably broadcast the 1-bit flags
from the equality check algorithm, a previously proposed Byzantine broadcast algorithm,
such as [6], is used. The algorithm from [6], denotedas Broadcast Defaulthereafter, reliably
broadcasts 1 bit by communicating nomore than P(n) bits in a complete graph, where P(n) is a
polynomial of n. In our setting, Gmight not be complete. However, the connectivity of G is
at least 2 f + 1. It is well-known that, in a graph with connectivity at least 2 f + 1 and at most
f faulty nodes, reliable end-to-end communication from any node i to any other node j can be
achieved by sending the same copy of data along a set of 2 f +1 node-disjoint paths fromnode
i to node j and taking themajority at node j. By doing this, we can emulate a complete graph
in an incomplete graph G. Then it can be showed that, by running Broadcast Default on
top of the emulated complete graph, reliably broadcasting the 1-bit flags can be completed
in O(nα) time units, for some constant α > 0.
• Phase 3: If Phase 3 is performed in instance k, every node i in Vk uses Broadcast Default
to reliably broadcast all the messages that it claims to have received from other nodes, and
sent to the other nodes, during Phase 1 and 2 of the k-th instance. Similar to the discussion
above about broadcasting the outcomes of equality check, it can be showed that the time it
takes to complete Phase 3 is O(Lnβ) for some constant β > 0.
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Figure 3: Example of pipelining
Now consider a sequence of Q > 0 instances of NAB. As discussed previously, Phase 3 will
be performed at most f ( f + 1) times throughout the execution of the algorithm. So we have the
following upper bound of the execution time of Q instances of NAB:
t(G, L,Q,NAB) ≤ Q
(
L
γ∗
+
L
ρ∗
+O(nα)
)
+ f ( f + 1)O(Lnβ). (24)
Then the throughput of NAB can be lower bounded by
T(G, L,NAB) = lim
Q→∞
LQ
t(G, L,Q,NAB)
(25)
≥ lim
Q→∞
LQ
Q
(
L
γ∗ +
L
ρ∗ +O(n
α)
)
+ f ( f + 1)O(Lnβ)
(26)
≥ lim
Q→∞
(
γ∗ + ρ∗
γ∗ρ∗
+
O(nα)
L
+
O(nβ+2)
Q
)−1
(since f < n/3) (27)
Notice that for a given graph G, {n, γ∗, ρ∗, α, β} are all constants independent of L and Q. So for
sufficiently large values of L and Q, the last two terms in the last inequality becomes negligible
compared to the first term, and the throughput of NAB approaches to a value that is at least as
large as TNAB, which is defined
TNAB(G) =
γ∗ρ∗
γ∗ + ρ∗
. (28)
In the above discussion, we implicitly assumed that transmissions during the unreliable broad-
cast in Phase 1 accomplish all at the same time, by assuming no propagation delay. However, when
propagation delay is considered, a node cannot forward a message/symbol until it finishes receiv-
ing it. So for the k-th instance of NAB, the information broadcast by the source propagates only one
hop every L/γk time units. So for a large network, the “time span” of Phase 1 can be much larger
than L/γk. This problem can be solved by pipelining: We divide the time horizon into rounds
of
(
L
γ∗ +
L
ρ∗ +O(n
α)
)
time units. For each instance of NAB, the L-bit input from the source node 1
propagates one hop per round, using the first L/γ∗ time units, until Phase 1 completes. Then the
remaining
(
L
ρ∗ +O(n
α)
)
time units of the last round is used to perform Phase 2. An example in
which the broadcast in Phase 1 takes 3 hops is shown in Figure 3. By pipelining, we achieve the
lower bound from Eq.6.
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E Construction of Γ
A subgraph of G belonging to Γ is obtained as follows: We will say that edges in W ⊂ E are
“explainable” if there exists a set F ⊂ V such that (i) F contains at most f nodes, and (ii) each edge
inW is incident on at least one node in F. Set F is then said to “explain setW”.
Consider each explainable set of edgesW ⊂ E. Suppose that F1, · · · , F∆ are all the subsets ofV
that explain edge set W. A subgraph ΨW of G is obtained by removing edges in W from E, and
nodes in
⋂∆
δ=1 Fδ fromV
4. In general,ΨW above may or may not contain the source node 1. Only
thoseΨW’s that do contain node 1 belongs to Γ.
F Proof of Theorem 2
In arbitrary point-to-point network G(G,E), the capacity of the BB problem with node 1 being
the source and up to f < n/3 faults satisfies the following upper bounds
F.1 CBB(G) ≤ γ
∗
Proof: Consider anyΨW ∈ Γ and letW is the set of edges in G but not inΨW . By the construction
of Γ, there must be at least one set F ⊂ V that explains W and does not contain the source node 1.
We are going to show that CBB(G) ≤MINCUT(ΨW, 1, i) for every node i , 1 that is inΨW .
Notice that there must exist a set of nodes that explains W and does not contain node 1;
otherwise node 1 is not inΨW. Without loss of generality, assume that F1 is one such set nodes.
First consider any node i , 1 in ΨW but i < F1. Let all the nodes in F1 be faulty such that they
refuse to communicate over edges in W, but otherwise behave correctly. In this case, since the
source is fault-free, node imust be able to receive the L-bit input that node 1 is trying to broadcast.
So CBB(G) ≤MINCUT(ΨW, 1, i).
Next we consider a node i , 1 in ΨW and i ∈ F1. Notice that node i cannot be contained in all
sets of nodes that explainW, otherwise node i is not inΨW . Then there are only two possibilities:
1. There exist a set F that explaining W that contains neither node 1 nor node i. In this case,
CBB(G) ≤MINCUT(ΨW, 1, i) according to the above argument by replacing F1 with F.
2. Otherwise, any set F that explains W and does not contain node i must contain node 1. Let
F2 be one such set of nodes.
Define V− = V − F1 − F2. V
− is not empty since F1 and F2 both contain at most f nodes and
there are n ≥ 3 f + 1 nodes in V. Consider two scenarios with the same input value x: (1)
Nodes in F1 (does not contain node 1) are faulty and refuse to communicate over edges inW,
but otherwise behave correctly; and (2) Nodes in F2 (contains node 1) are faulty and refuse
to communicate over edges inW, but otherwise behave correctly. In both cases, nodes in V−
are fault-free.
Observe that among edges between nodes in V− and F1 ∪ F2, only edges between V
− and
F1 ∩ F2 could have been removed, because otherwiseW cannot be explained by both F1 and
F2. So nodes in V
− cannot distinguish between the two scenarios above. In scenario (1), the
source node 1 is not faulty. Hence nodes in V− must agree with the value x that node 1 is
trying to broadcast, according to the validity condition. Since nodes inV− cannot distinguish
4It is possible that ΨW for different W may be identical. This does not affect the correctness of
our algorithm.
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between the two scenarios, they must also set their outputs to x in scenario (2), even though
in this case the source node 1 is faulty. Then according to the agreement condition, node i
must agree with nodes in V− in scenario (2), which means that node i also have to learn x.
So CBB(G) ≤ MINCUT(ΨW, 1, i).
This completes the proof. 
F.2 CBB(G) ≤ 2ρ
∗
Proof: For a subgraph H ∈ Ω1 (and accordingly H ∈ Ω1), denote
UH = min
nodes i, j in H
MINCUT(H, i, j).
We will prove the upper bound by showing that CBB(G) ≤ UH for every H ∈ Ω1.
Suppose on the contrary that Byzantine broadcast can be done at a rate R > UH + ǫ for some
constant ǫ > 0. So there exists a BB algorithm, namedA, that can broadcast t(UH + ǫ) bits in using
t time units, for some t > 0.
Let E be a set of edges in H that corresponds to one of the minimum-cuts in H. In other words,∑
e∈E ze = UH, and the nodes in H can be partitioned into two non-empty sets L and R such that
L and R are disconnected from each other if edges in E are removed. Also denote F as the set of
nodes that are in G but not in H. Notice that since H contains (n − f ) nodes, F contains f nodes.
Notice that in t time units, at most tUH < t(UH + ǫ) bits of information can be sent over edges in
E. According to the pigeonhole principle, there must exist two different input values of t(UH + ǫ)
bits, denoted as u and v, such that in the absence of misbehavior, broadcasting u and v with
algorithmA results in the same communication pattern over edges in E.
First consider the case when F contains the source node 1. Consider the three scenarios using
algorithmA:
1. Node 1 broadcasts u, and none of the nodesmisbehaves. So all nodes should set their outputs
to u.
2. Node 1 broadcasts v, and none of the nodesmisbehaves. So all nodes should set their outputs
to v.
3. Nodes in F are faulty (includes the source node 1). The faulty nodes in F behave to nodes in
L as in scenario 1, and behave to nodes in R as in scenario 2.
It can be showed that nodes in L cannot distinguish scenario 1 from scenario 3, and nodes in R
cannot distinguish scenario 2 from scenario 3. So in scenario 3, nodes in L set their outputs to u
and nodes in R set their outputs to v. This violates the agreement condition and contradicts with
the assumption thatA solves BB at rate UH + ǫ. Hence CBB(G) ≤ UH.
Next consider the case when F does not contain the source node 1. Without loss of generality,
suppose that node 1 is in L. Consider the following three scenarios:
1. Node 1 broadcasts u, and none of the nodesmisbehaves. So all nodes should set their outputs
to u.
2. Node 1 broadcasts v, and none of the nodesmisbehaves. So all nodes should set their outputs
to v.
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3. Node 1 broadcasts u, and nodes in F are faulty. The faulty nodes in F behave to nodes in L
as in scenario 1, and behave to nodes in R as in scenario 2.
In this case, we can also show that nodes in L cannot distinguish scenario 1 from scenario 3, and
nodes in R cannot distinguish scenario 2 from scenario 3. So in scenario 3, nodes in L set their
outputs to u and nodes in R set their outputs to v. This violates the agreement condition and
contradicts with the assumption that A solves BB at rate UH + ǫ. Hence CBB(G) ≤ UH, and this
completes the proof. 
G Proof of Theorem 3
Now we compare TNAB(G) with the upper bound of CBB(G) from Theorem 2. Recall that
TNAB(G) =
γ∗ρ∗
γ∗ + ρ∗
and
CBB(G) ≤ min(γ
∗, 2ρ∗).
There are 3 cases:
1. γ∗ ≤ ρ∗: Observe that TNAB(G) is an increasing function of both γ
∗ and ρ∗. For a given γ∗, it is
minimized when ρ∗ is minimized. So
TNAB(G) ≥
γ∗2
γ∗ + γ∗
=
γ∗
2
≥
CBB(G)
2
. (29)
The last inequality is due to γ∗ ≥ CBB(G).
2. γ∗ ≤ 2ρ∗:
TNAB(G) ≥
γ∗ρ∗
2ρ∗ + ρ∗
=
γ∗
3
≥
CBB(G)
3
. (30)
The last inequality is due to γ∗ ≥ CBB(G).
3. γ∗ > 2ρ∗: Since TNAB(G) is an increasing function of both γ
∗, for a given ρ∗, it is minimized
when γ∗ is minimized. So
TNAB(G) ≥
2ρ∗2
2ρ∗ + ρ∗
=
2ρ∗
3
≥
CBB(G)
3
. (31)
The second inequality is due to 2ρ∗ ≥ CBB(G).
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